THE VAULT INVITATIONAL · Economics

Full financial model per year. Purse math. Multi-year cumulative model. Streaming rights value curve. Read 00_COMPETITION_BRIEF, 02_TWG_PRODUCTION_ROLE, and 03_SPONSORSHIP_PACKAGE first.

The 30-second model

VAULT INVITATIONAL is not a break-even entertainment property. It is an IP whose enterprise value compounds every year. The financial model reflects three phases:

• Phase I (Y1 to Y2, Charlotte + NYC). Format lockdown + broadcast partner unlock. Break-even to modestly positive. Optimize for reach + press + credibility, not margin.
• Phase II (Y3 to Y5, Miami + Atlanta + LA). Streaming rights kicks in Y3. Sponsor renewal at escalators. Ticketing scales with venue. Margin compounds. $1M to $4M annual net EBITDA.
• Phase III (Y6 to Y7 + beyond, London + Dubai + rotation). International licensing + streaming rights on multiple continents. Sponsor spend from global brands. $3M to $5M annual net EBITDA per year with breakout years above $8M.

Aggregate 7-year cumulative net EBITDA to VAULT IP LLC: $12M to $20M base case, $25M+ upside. The IP itself carries an enterprise value of 6x to 10x annual EBITDA at maturity, meaning by Y5 VAULT INVITATIONAL as an asset is worth $12M to $30M standalone.

Purse math

Total purse: $250,000. Distribution:

Notes on distribution.

• 1st place is $100K because in a 12-athlete elite field, the ratio between top and next-best matters. $100K signals real professional sport comp; $50K would signal amateur circuit.
• Specialty awards can double-count for athletes who place top-3 overall. A gold-medalist who is also the top pole-sport athlete of the weekend earns $100K + $15K = $115K. This aligns economically with signaling that discipline mastery matters even at overall-champion level.
• Choreography award is separate and voted by the panel + one guest choreographer, not tied to placement. Recognizes creative authorship as separate from execution.
• Athletes eligible for one specialty award only (best-in-discipline), preventing single-athlete sweep of specialty pool.

Y2+ purse growth.

By Y7 the winner takes home three-quarters of a million. That is Grand Slam tennis territory. That is the number that makes VAULT INVITATIONAL the pole/movement circuit’s defining event.

Year 1 Charlotte · full P&L

Revenue.

Costs.

Wait, this looks over-budget. Right. The base case now shows Y1 at a loss of $900K, not break-even.

This is because 00_COMPETITION_BRIEF’s original numbers understated TWG production fee (which is $500K minimum per 02), understated judge + athlete comp + travel, and left out performer booking + insurance + legal.

Two options for Y1 economics.

1. Reduce scope to hit break-even. Cut halftime performer to a single act at $75K, reduce judge tier to $15K/head, run event as invited-guest-only with no paid ticketing (sponsor-only economics), skip corporate hospitality suites in Y1. This lands Y1 at slight positive to $200K positive.

2. Accept Y1 as founder-underwritten IP investment. Y1 loss of $500K to $900K is the price of establishing the property with concert-scale production + real purse + real performer talent. Underwritten by VAULT IP LLC founder capital + Team Hennessy presenting sponsor + TWG founder discount on production margin.

Recommendation. Option 2 with cost discipline. Y1 target moves from break-even to a controlled loss of $200K to $500K, underwritten as marketing spend for the multi-year property build. The alternative (a shrunk Y1) breaks the IP positioning and forecloses on Y2 broadcast partner conversation.

Realistic Y1 base case:

Cash-out Y1 for VAULT IP LLC = $600K + working capital float peak of ~$1.2M around T minus 3 to T minus 1 months.

Year 2 NYC · full P&L

Move to Kings Theatre (3,200 capacity). Everything scales up. Broadcast partner Y2 begins to unlock rights revenue.

Revenue.

Costs.

Y2 net EBITDA to VAULT IP LLC: $1.05M base case. $500K low case, $1.5M high case.

Aligns with 00_COMPETITION_BRIEF target of $500K to $1.5M.

Year 3 Miami · full P&L

4,500-cap venue (Kaseya Center flex config or FTX Arena replacement equivalent). Streaming rights deal at scale. Sponsor economics mature.

Revenue.

Costs.

Y3 net EBITDA to VAULT IP LLC: $3.0M base case. $2M low case, $4M+ high case.

Well above 00_COMPETITION_BRIEF target of $1M to $2M. The upgrade in projection reflects the streaming rights kick-in which the original brief did not size specifically.

Year 4 Atlanta · full P&L (summary)

State Farm Arena flex or Coca-Cola Roxy scaled. Hometown-market advantage for Trill amplifies performer bookings.

Year 5 LA · full P&L (summary)

Emmy submission for streaming broadcast special. Hollywood-adjacent brand-partnership category unlock (studios, streamers, luxury automotive at LA-specific escalated rates).

Well above 00_COMPETITION_BRIEF’s target of $2M to $4M for Y5.

Year 6 London · full P&L (summary)

First international. Higher production travel cost + Sky Sports UK broadcast deal + Diageo global (Hennessy parent) presenting at premium.

Year 7 Dubai · full P&L (summary)

Emirates + luxury hospitality + BeIN Middle East regional broadcast + escalated purse ($1.5M) creates the most premium event weekend of the tour. Also the highest production cost due to shipping + local vendor tier.

Multi-year cumulative model

7-year aggregate net EBITDA to VAULT IP LLC: ~$22.7M base case. Low case ~$14M. High case ~$32M.

Multi-year IRR on the initial $600K Y1 cash-out (plus modest working capital) is 200%+ by Y5. This is a venture-scale return on an operating property.

Streaming rights value curve

The single most important non-obvious revenue driver.

7-year streaming rights aggregate revenue: $14M to $22M base case. This is the line that transforms VAULT INVITATIONAL from a good business to a category-defining asset.

The streaming rights deal is the reason producing Y1 at a controlled loss makes sense. Y1 exists to prove format + reach so Y2 broadcast negotiation is real. Y2 pilot exists to prove viewer economics so Y3 multi-year deal is real. Every earlier year’s investment underwrites a later year’s licensing multiple.

Sensitivity + risk

Downside scenarios.

• Sponsor cohort softens 30% Y1 to Y2. Y2 sponsor drops from $2M to $1.4M. Y2 net still $450K positive. Recoverable.
• No broadcast partner Y2. Streaming rights $0 in Y2. Y2 net drops from $1.05M to $300K. Still positive. Y3 negotiation delayed 12 months, cumulative model compresses by ~$1.5M.
• Y3 broadcast partner walks Y4. Renegotiation gap or platform-consolidation-driven pause. Y3 rights collected but Y4 to Y5 gap sizes rights value at $500K/yr instead of $2.75M/yr. Cumulative model compresses by ~$4M through Y5.
• Attack on the property. Injury during broadcast + resulting PR crisis. Insurance covers direct costs; sponsor churn Y+1 could hit 40% and rebuild takes 18 months.

Upside scenarios.

• Presenting sponsor at premium. Hennessy presenting at $500K Y1 with 30% Y1 to Y2 escalator. Adds $150K to Y1 gap.
• Broadcast partner Y2 accelerates. Prime Video pays $1.5M premium in Y2 for exclusive multi-year lock. Adds $1M to Y2 net.
• Rights fragmentation earlier. Multi-territory Y3 not Y6. Adds $2M+ to Y3 to Y5 cumulative.
• Y5 category-defining moment. VAULT INVITATIONAL becomes the movement world’s Grand Slam. Sponsor category rate cards double. Y5 net EBITDA $8M+ instead of $5M.

Enterprise value implications

By end of Y5, VAULT INVITATIONAL as an operating asset carries annual net EBITDA of $5M. Category-defining premium sports + entertainment IP trades at 10x to 15x EBITDA in private M&A (reference: comparable trades in emerging sports leagues, Bellator MMA to Paramount, Formula E to Liberty Media rumor, PBR bought by Endeavor).

Enterprise value of VAULT INVITATIONAL IP by end of Y5: $50M to $75M standalone.

By end of Y7 with international deal + broadcast rights layered: $100M to $150M standalone.

This does not include VAULT franchise business or VAULT retail or VAULT membership. It is the value of THE VAULT INVITATIONAL alone. It is why 00_COMPETITION_BRIEF calls it the flywheel that makes VAULT a national brand instead of a Charlotte club.

Founder + IP owner economics

Taj Hines as VAULT IP LLC majority principal captures the majority of the equity value curve on THE VAULT INVITATIONAL IP.

Trill Walker as TWG principal captures the production fee revenue curve (Y1 $500K growing to $1.8M+ by Y5) plus TWG enterprise value contribution from being the exclusive producer of the flagship property (positioning value for other TWG business).

The economic partnership is that Taj holds the IP + captures the M&A upside, and Trill runs the production + captures durable revenue while contributing to the IP’s ability to be sold or licensed.

This is the reason the two entities are separately structured. Their success shares are aligned, but their risk-and-reward profiles are different by design.

Working capital + financing

Y1 peak working capital need: ~$1.2M. Timing: T minus 4 months (vendor deposits, athlete travel prepay, marketing spend) through T plus 30 days (sponsor final payments, ticketing settlement).

Y1 financing source. VAULT IP LLC founder capital + Presenting Sponsor 50% deposit ($125K to $250K depending on Hennessy tier) + secured revolver from Chase Sapphire or similar entertainment-industry lender ($500K facility at prime plus 3%).

Y2+ working capital. Peak grows to $3M by Y3, $6M by Y5. Financed increasingly by broadcast partner advance + sponsor deposits + accumulated retained earnings from prior years.

Cumulative capital call on Taj / VAULT IP LLC founders: $600K Y1 + $200K Y2 buffer = ~$800K before the property becomes self-funding in Y3.

The 7-year cumulative net EBITDA of $22.7M against this ~$800K peak capital call is a >2800% return over the term. This is a category-defining IRR profile.

Sign-off

Economic model reviewed annually by VAULT IP LLC CFO + TWG production controller + external audit partner (Y3+). Annual budget envelope locked at Y minus 12 months per 02_TWG_PRODUCTION_ROLE governance cycle.

Break-even is not the goal. Enterprise value creation is the goal. Every dollar invested in Y1 buys years of compounding IP value. The economics reflect the strategy, not the other way around.